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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
DARWIN J. THOMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20020144-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State's Brief of Appellant, the 
State submits the following in reply to the arguments contained in defendant's brief. 
DRAWING ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IN THE STATE'S 
FAVOR, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED 
A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY 
SHOVED THE VICTIM IN RETALIATION FOR HER ROLE AS A 
WITNESS OR INFORMANT AGAINST HIM 
As stated in the State's opening brief, the magistrate found that defendant had 
assaulted the victim by intentionally shoving her. The magistrate refused to bind over only 
because he believed that the evidence did not support a probable cause finding that the 
assault was in retaliation for the victim's role as a witness or informant. 
1 
In his responsive brief, defendant challenges the magistrate's conclusion that he 
assaulted the victim by intentionally shoving her. He also argues that the magistrate properly 
concluded that the evidence did not support a reasonable belief that the shove was in 
retaliation for her role as a witness or informant. Br. Aple. 7-8. 
As explained below, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the 
evidence and reasonable inferences support the magistrate's conclusion that defendant 
intentionally shoved Ms. Christensen. Moreover, the reasonable inferences from the 
evidence, not mere speculation, support a reasonable belief that defendant shoved Ms. 
Christensen in retaliation for her role as a witness or informant against him. 
A. The evidence supports the magistrate's conclusion that defendant intentionally 
shoved the victim* 
Defendant contends that it is "more likely that someone accidentally or inadvertently 
bumped into Christensen," than it is that "someone intentionally bumped" into her. Br. Aple. 
6. Defendant supports this contention by pointing to the fact that the "incident occurred at 
a dance, with about 300 or 400 people in attendance" and that Christensen and her friend 
were "on the edge of the dance floor" with "at least eight other people nearby." Id. at 6-7. 
Defendant posits that it is "nearly impossible to be at a dance without bumping into 
someone," and that it is "highly possible that a dancer or someone walking by not paying 
attention bumped into Christensen accidentally." Id. at 6. Defendant finally surmises that 
even if he did "bump" into Ms. Christensen, "it was more likely an accident." Id. at 7. 
2 
Defendant's theories rely solely on the inferences drawn in his favor and ignore the 
reasonable inferences supporting the State's theory (and the magistrate's conclusion), that 
defendant intentionally shoved Ms. Christensen. 
Bindover standard. As explained in the State's opening brief, a magistrate is required 
to bind a defendant over for trial when the State presents "sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16. In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable 
belief that defendant committed the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id. at f 10 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 
% 3, 26 P.3d 223. Thus, when the evidence gives rise to alternative inferences, one 
supporting guilt and the other innocence, the magistrate must choose the inference supporting 
guilt and allow a jury to resolve the competing inferences. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 20. 
In other words, "[i]t is not for the [magistrate] at a preliminary hearing to accept the 
defendant's version of the facts over the legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the 
[State's] evidence." People v. District Court of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial District, 
803 P.2d 193,196 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Rather, deciding between inferences and conflicting evidence is left for the jury. See Clark, 
2001 UT 9, ^  10. Accordingly, "[a] magistrate errs when he or she chooses an inference 
resulting in release of a defendant when a reasonable alternative inference" supports the 
3 
State's case. See State v. Dunn, 117 Wis. 2d 487,491,345 N.W.2d 69,71 (Wis. App.), affd, 
121 Wis. 2d 389, 359 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. 1984). 
This case. In concluding that defendant assaulted Ms. Christensen, the magistrate 
properly ignored the inferences supporting defendant's theories and accepted those 
reasonable inferences supporting the State's case. Ms. Christensen testified that although 
she sought to avoid defendant amongst the 300 to 400 people at the dance, he still managed 
to position himself within two or three couples of her whenever she danced. R. 35:12-13. 
Ms. Christensen's and Mr. Cook's testimony also rebutted defendant's theory that Ms. 
Christensen was accidentally bumped. Based on the force with which Ms. Christensen fell 
forward, both were certain that the shove had to have been intentional and not the result of 
an accidental bump. R. 35:8-9,22-23. 
Despite defendant's suggestion there were many others near enough to have bumped 
into Ms. Christensen, she testified that while she stood talking to Mr. Cook, there were no 
other couples "within three or four feet. There was plenty of room around us. Everybody 
was spread all over the place. There were no other people talking to [Cook] and I at that 
time. We were just on the sides." R. 35:8. Mr. Cook testified that there were maybe six 
people within a ten-foot radius and four or five within a five-foot radius. R. 35:24. Because 
neither Ms. Christensen nor Mr. Cook had their backs to the dance floor, it was unlikely that 
she was accidentally bumped by a dancer. R. 35:20. 
4 
Ms. Christensen testified that after she was shoved, she "looked to see what had 
happened, and it was [defendant] walking by with a date or a dance partner." R. 35:8. She 
added, "There was not anybody else there at that time, on that side of me." R. 35:8-9. 
Although it is possible that someone else shoved or bumped into Ms. Christensen, the 
testimony, taken together, gives rise to a reasonable belief that defendant intentionally 
shoved her. As explained, the magistrate is required to bind the defendant over so long as 
a reasonable inference can be drawn of defendant's guilt, even though alternative innocent 
explanations may also exist. Thus, under the bindover standard set forth in Clark, the 
magistrate properly ignored the innocent explanation and concluded that defendant 
intentionally shoved Ms. Christensen. 
B. That defendant shoved the victim in retaliation for her role as a witness or 
informant is not mere speculation; rather it is supported by the reasonable 
inferences from the evidence. 
Defendant concedes that the magistrate must view the evidence and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, but argues that only speculation, not 
reasonable inferences, supports the conclusion that defendant shoved Ms. Christensen in 
retaliation for her role as a witness. Defendant asserts, "The fact that two people are 
involved in a court proceeding does not mean that one is bound to assault the other." Br. 
Aple. 7. Thus, defendant concludes, it is mere speculation to conclude that defendant 
"bumped" into Ms. Christensen in retaliation for her role as a witness. Br. Aple. 7. 
5 
Like the first claim, this argument impermissibly relies on defendant's view of the 
evidence, while ignoring the evidence that supports the State's position. First, "bump" is 
defendant's characterization of what happened to Ms. Christensen. However, at the 
preliminary hearing, the only testimony was that the force with which Ms. Christensen was 
struck could not have resulted from an accidental "bump." Rather, Ms. Christensen and Mr. 
Cook were certain that she had been intentionally shoved. 
Second, while it is true that people involved in a court proceeding "are not bound to 
assault the other," when one does so, it is reasonable to infer that the assault was motivated 
by the high emotions caused by the legal proceedings. Here, as explained in the State's 
opening brief, the only possible motive presented was that defendant was angry with Ms. 
Christensen because of her role as a witness or informant in one or both of the legal 
proceedings against him. As explained in Clark, even if another reasonable motive had been 
presented, the magistrate was required to choose the inference that supported the State's 
case, i.e., that defendant's motive for shoving Ms. Christensen was to retaliate against her 
for her role as a witness or informant against him. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe defendant 
intentionally shoved Ms. Christensen was correct and should be affirmed. The magistrate's 
conclusion that the evidence did not support a reasonable belief that defendant's action was 
in retaliation for the victim's role as a witness or informant was incorrect and should be 
reversed. 
6 
Accordingly, the magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over for trial and 
dismissing the information should be reversed and the case remanded for reinstatement of 
the charge and entry of an order binding defendant over for trial. 
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